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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2018, the Supreme Court severely limited the applicability of the Alien 
Tort Statute by holding that foreign corporations cannot be defendants under 
the current statute.1 By deciding the case on these grounds, however, the Court 
avoided resolving a much broader question. The plaintiffs in Jesner, in an 
attempt to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality that is embed-
ded in U.S. statutory interpretation, argued that Arab Bank’s conduct did 
“touch and concern” the United States with sufficient force to sustain a claim.2 
The plaintiffs specifically focused on Arab Bank’s New York based dollar-
clearing operation.3 
Each year globally, the U.S. Dollar is used in transactions totaling in the 
trillions.4 Many of these transactions occur electronically, and often neither 
the originator nor the receiver of the transaction is a U.S. person.5 Electronic 
transactions must be cleared so that the originator’s and receiver’s accounts 
are correctly adjusted.6 In the modern global financial system, accounts are 
cleared electronically, with essentially zero human activity in the actual clear-
ing process.7 
The Supreme Court is far from the first court to dodge the delicate issue of 
electronic payment systems. In a decision leading up to Jesner, the Second 
Circuit wrote: 
It seems to us to be unwise to decide the difficult and sensitive 
issue of whether the clearing of foreign dollar-denominated 
payments through a branch in New York could, under these 
circumstances, displace the presumption against the 
 
 1 Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1405 (2018) (“Congress, not the Judiciary, 
must decide whether to expand the scope of liability under the [Alien Tort Statute] to in-
clude foreign corporations.”). 
 2 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124–25 (2013) (finding that the 
conduct sustaining an Alien Tort Statute claim must have some sufficient connection to the 
United States). 
 3 Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1394 (“[P]etitioners allege as well that Arab Bank used its New 
York branch to clear dollar-denominated transactions” and that “some of these . . . trans-
actions benefited terrorists.”) 
 4 David Scutt, Here’s How Much Currency is Traded Every Day, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 
2, 2016), https://www.businessinsider.com/heres-how-much-currency-is-traded-every-day 
-2016-9. 
 5 Julia Kagan, Wire Transfer, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.investopedi 
a.com/terms/w/wiretransfer.asp. 
 6 Dietrich Domanski, Central Clearing: Trends and Current Issues, BIS (Dec. 6, 2015), 
https://bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1512g.htm. 
 7 Tania Kishore Jaleel, What is Electronic Clearing Service (ECS)?, BUS. STANDARD 
(Jan. 20, 2013), https://www.business-standard.com/article/pf/what-is-electronic-clearing- 
service-ecs-111070800019_1.html. 
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extraterritorial application of the [Alien Torts Statute], when it 
was not the focus of either the district court’s decision or the 
briefing on appeal.8 
Part of this apparently shared reluctance is undoubtedly because conclu-
sively deciding whether dollar-clearing operations touch and concern the 
United States will have significant policy implications, regardless of the deci-
sion. The Supreme Court is wary of turning itself into a court of global judicial 
jurisdiction, as evidenced by its history of limiting the rights of foreign civil 
plaintiffs to sue in U.S. court.9 At the same time, however, the United States 
has pursued an aggressive global financial regulatory scheme often with the 
potential for criminal liability. This global enforcement is sometimes justified 
by relatively insignificant contact with U.S. territory or areas of jurisdiction. 
The Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission have 
both opined that dollar-clearing operations are enough to subject the entire 
transaction and its participants to U.S. law.10 There are, of course, different 
substantive policy considerations involved when the government is the party 
bringing the suit. In the case of an enforcement action, the government has 
already made the decision that the case is worth bringing in U.S. court—and 
presumably any negative foreign policy implications were already considered 
and overcome. In contrast, there is no sovereign filter when foreign plaintiffs 
attempt to bring an action.11 While different concerns may animate a court’s 
thinking, it is not clear that there is an easy method for treating the same action 
differently in the civil or criminal context. Without a change to the underlying 
statute, or a bifurcation of the law of extraterritoriality, a determination of 
whether a particular activity is a sufficient nexus to the United States to be 
territorial would cut across contexts. In this specific context, for example, a 
determination that dollar-clearing could support criminal prosecution—based 
on the activity’s touch and concern to the United States—would presumably 
also support a civil action by a non-government plaintiff. 
Given that a large portion of international transactions involve dollar-
clearing at some point, the status in U.S. law of dollar-clearing operations is 
one of global financial concern.12 The United States has traditionally 
 
 8 In re Arab Bank, PLC, 808 F.3d 144, 158 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 9 Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1081 (2015). 
 10 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 (dd)(2) (West 1998); CRIMINAL DIV. OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 
AND THE ENF’T DIV. OF THE U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. 
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crim 
inal-fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf. 
 11 For a more detailed discussion of these policy considerations, see infra pages 609–
610. 
 12 Chase Manhattan Bank v. State of Iran, 484 F.Supp 832, 836 (S.D.N.Y. Feb 15, 1980) 
(describing the U.S. dollar as “the recognized reserve currency for international trade”); 
Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1395 (“The CHIPS system is used for dollar-denominated transactions 
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exercised significant influence in shaping the global economic system through 
both foreign and domestic policy.13 However, continued indecisiveness on the 
limits of U.S. prescriptive jurisdiction has potential negative repercussions for 
the entire global financial system and the norms surrounding regulation of a 
system that at times appears to have no borders. 
This Note will examine the treatment of currency-clearing operations in 
U.S. law from the perspective of international financial institutions. First, this 
Note will examine the presumption against extraterritoriality in U.S. law and 
the norms regarding extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction in international 
law. Next, this Note will examine the treatment of currency-clearing opera-
tions in relation to extraterritoriality in United States and selected foreign ju-
risdictions. Finally, this Note will argue that the United States, as a global 
financial leader, should definitively establish a restrained approach to basing 
prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction on currency-clearing, with an eye 
towards creating an international norm on the topic. 
II. EXTRATERRITORIAL PRESCRIPTIVE JURISDICTION IN UNITED STATES  
A. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality in United States Law and Its 
Application 
 
Historically, United States courts have limited the impact of domestic law 
beyond the country’s borders.14 The modern theory of extraterritoriality, es-
pecially in the realm of financial crimes, was spawned by Oliver Wendell 
Holmes in 1909.15 Holmes wrote in an early antitrust case that “the general 
and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful 
must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done.”16 
The doctrine lost much of its bite, however, until the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co. (ARAMCO), where the Court 
 
and for transactions where the dollar is used as an intermediate currency to fulfill a currency 
exchange.”). 
 13 Christopher Smart, The Future of the Dollar — and Its Role in Financial Diplomacy, 
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Dec. 16, 2018), https://carnegieendowment.org/ 
2018/12/16/future-of-dollar-and-its-role-in-financial-diplomacy-pub-77986 (“In a world 
of imperfect choices, other countries have come to rely on the U.S. record of building rules-
based financial institutions, proposing agendas for policy coordination and shaping pro-
gress toward open markets.”); see also Robert E. Litan, The “Globalization Challenge: 
The U.S. Role in Shaping World Trade and Investment, BROOKINGS (Mar. 1, 2000), 
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-globalization-challenge-the-u-s-role-in-shaping-
world-trade-and-investment/ 
 14 See generally Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949). 
 15 William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85, 85 (1998). 
 16 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (finding that the 
Sherman Antitrust Act did not cover conduct occurring wholly within a foreign country). 
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revived the presumption.17 Chief Justice Rehnquist there noted that “[i]t is a 
longstanding principle of American law ‘that legislation of Congress, unless 
a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the United States.’”18 Importantly, Rehnquist was careful to state that 
the presumption is only one of statutory construction; with explicit instruction, 
Congress is free to pass laws governing conduct anywhere.19 
Since the Court’s decision in ARAMCO, the Court has strengthened the 
presumption. In Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. the Court clarified 
that for a statute to apply extraterritorially, it must state explicitly that it does 
so.20 The Court there said courts ought not to interpret whether Congress 
would have intended the statute to apply extraterritorially, stating: 
The results of judicial-speculation-made-law—divining what 
Congress would have wanted if it had thought of the situation 
before the court—demonstrate the wisdom of the presumption 
against extraterritoriality. Rather than guess anew in each case, 
we apply the presumption in all cases, preserving a stable 
background against which Congress can legislate with predict-
able effects.21 
Morrison held that a “clear indication” of Congressional intent is neces-
sary to get around the presumption.22 Morrison involved Australian stock-
holders suing an Australian bank whose stock was not directly listed in the 
United States, alleging securities violations.23 The Court focused on the fact 
that the bulk of the allegedly fraudulent actions occurred overseas, and the 
harm the plaintiffs suffered similarly occurred on foreign soil.24 
The Supreme Court has strengthened the presumption even more since 
Morrison. While Morrison required only a clear indication, the Court in RJR 
Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community went even further, requiring that Con-
gress “affirmatively and unmistakably” indicate a statute’s extraterritorial 
 
 17 E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co. 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (finding that Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act did not apply to a Lebanese-born American citizen working in Arabian 
American Oil Co’s (ARAMCO’s) Saudi Arabian offices, because of the presumption 
against extraterritorial application). 
 18 Id. at 248 (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). 
 19 Id. at 259. 
 20 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010). 
 21 Id. at 261. 
 22 Id. at 255. 
 23 Id. at 252–53. 
 24 Id. at 273 (noting that “all aspects of the purchases complained of by those petitioners 
who still have live claims occurred outside the United States” and dismissing the claims 
for lack of jurisdiction as a result). 
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application.25 In that case, the European Community and its member states 
sued RJR Nabisco in U.S. federal court for violations of the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), arguing that RJR had engaged 
in a money laundering scheme.26 Like Morrison, the conduct about which the 
plaintiffs complained occurred almost entirely overseas, as did the harm suf-
fered. The plaintiffs brought their action under RICO’s private right of ac-
tion.27 The Court, while it did find that Congress intended RICO’s prohibi-
tions to apply overseas, applied the intent test separately to the private right 
of action provision.28 
Outside the financial arena, the Court has similarly limited the ability of 
foreign plaintiffs to sue in U.S. courts for conduct occurring abroad. In its line 
of cases dealing with the Alien Torts Statute, the Court has progressively lim-
ited the scope of the action available to foreign plaintiffs.29 
The unifying theme of all these lines of litigation is that United States 
courts should not hear claims that do not concern the United States. This prin-
ciple, on its face, is simple and agreeable. And in the context of civil litigation 
brought by foreign plaintiffs, the Supreme Court has been more than willing 
to enforce this.30 But when the United States is participating as a litigant, ei-
ther in a prosecutorial role or as a civil plaintiff—for example, when it brings 
a civil enforcement action—the government is willing to advocate for a much 
more expansive view of U.S. authority to adjudicate disputes.31 
In contrast to the restrained attitude towards civil complaints, U.S. prose-
cutors have taken a nearly global view of their authority. In a guidance docu-
ment describing the scope of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), the 
 
 25 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016); see also Pamela 
K. Bookman, Doubling Down on Litigation Isolationism, 110 AJIL UNBOUND 57, 57-58 
(2016) (arguing that the Congressional intent requirement in RJR Nabisco is in fact more 
burdensome to foreign plaintiffs than the Morrison requirement). 
 26 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2098. 
 27 Id. at 2106. 
 28 Id. (“[L]ogic requires that we separately apply the presumption against extraterritori-
ality to RICO’s cause of action despite our conclusion that the presumption has been over-
come with respect to RICO’s substantive prohibitions.”). 
 29 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004) (noting the problems with 
creating a private right of action for foreign plaintiffs against foreign defendants); Kiobel 
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 598 U.S. 108, 117 (2013) (noting the potential negative 
foreign policy implications of creating private rights of action for foreign plaintiffs). 
 30 Bookman, supra note 25, at 57–58. 
 31 For instance, note the contrast between the Department of Justice’s position regarding 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act with that taken in civil cases. Compare CRIMINAL DIV. 
OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND THE ENF’T DIV. OF THE U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, A 
RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2012), https://www.justi 
ce.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf with Brief for 
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC 
(2017) (No. 16–499), 2017 WL 2792284 (noting the Government’s position that clearing 
alone is not a sufficient domestic nexus). 
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DOJ and the SEC have stated that, in their view, the mere routing of transac-
tions through the United States is enough to subject participants to United 
States criminal financial law.32 DOJ officials have entered into deferred pros-
ecution agreements with foreign companies for exactly the type of foreign 
conduct that civil plaintiffs cannot bring in United States courts.33 In that case, 
the DOJ explicitly relied on the fact that several of the transactions in question 
were wired electronically through the United States.34 
This apparent inconsistency in treatment is not entirely without justifica-
tion. As the Supreme Court noted, there are additional foreign policy concerns 
involved when creating a private right of action, compared to enforcement by 
U.S. officials of U.S. law.35 However, the Court’s somewhat strained logic in 
Jesner is illustrative of the eventual limit of such distinctions. A decision on 
the extraterritoriality of dollar-clearing operations cannot distinguish between 
civil and criminal sanctions—the conduct is either connected to the U.S. or it 
is not. This civil-criminal divide in the application of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is unsustainable in the long run. 
 
B. International Law Limiting Countries’ Abilities to Promulgate and 
Enforce Legislation with Extraterritorial Effects 
 
Technically, there is no absolute prohibition against universal prescriptive 
jurisdiction in international law. However, in practice, it is reserved for ex-
traordinary circumstances and is generally discouraged. Indeed, there is 
thought to be a norm regarding the universal applicability of certain particu-
larly egregious crimes, such as genocide or crimes against humanity.36 In fact, 
163 of 193 UN Member states have enacted laws of universal jurisdiction re-
lating to crimes against humanity.37 The application of universal prescriptive 
jurisdiction beyond these well-worn and widely agreed upon areas, however, 
is a far more controversial prospect.38 
 
 32 See supra note 10. 
 33 Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. JGC Corp., No. 4:11-cr-00260 
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 06, 2011); see also Lauren Ann Ross, Note, Using Foreign Relations Law 
to Limit Extraterritorial Application of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 62 DUKE L.J. 
445, 447 (2012) (“a Japanese company haled into court in Texas for conduct . . . initiated 
in Europe, the effects of which were felt in Africa.”). 
 34 Ross, supra note 33, at 447. 
 35 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004) (noting the problems with 
creating a private right of action for foreign plaintiffs against foreign defendants); Kiobel 
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 117 (2013) (noting the potential negative 
foreign policy implications of creating private rights of action for foreign plaintiffs). 
 36 Universal Jurisdiction: A Preliminary Survey of Legislation Around the World, 
AMNESTY INT’L (2012), https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/24000/ior530192 
012en.pdf. 
 37 Id. at 12. 
 38 See generally Universal Jurisdiction, INT’L JUSTICE RES. CTR., https://ijrcenter.org/ca 
2020] CIRCUIT BOARD JURISDICTION  599 
Unlike in the domestic sphere, international law operates in a negative 
space. In one of the earliest and most influential international cases, the Per-
manent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) (the League of Nations predeces-
sor to the International Court of Justice) stated that states, as independent sov-
ereigns, are generally free to do as they wish and assert their jurisdiction 
anywhere they see fit—assuming there is not a specific restriction imposed by 
international law.39 
States do not have free license to assert their jurisdiction and exercise their 
power anywhere, however. The PCIJ noted in the Lotus Case that while states 
theoretically have jurisdiction globally, “the first and foremost restriction im-
posed by international law upon a State [sic] is that—failing the existence of 
a permissive rule to the contrary—it may not exercise its power in any form 
in the territory of another State.”40 Because of the exclusive right of sovereign 
states to govern their own territory, there is a general presumption against 
states passing and enforcing laws that would regulate conduct in the territory 
of other states.41 The Lotus Case and the Island of Palmas Case both illustrate 
the general principle that a state’s ability to exercise extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion is a matter of international law, not just the state’s domestic law. 
As international law has developed and the world has globalized, the va-
lidity of a state’s exercise of jurisdiction has shifted away from that of a pure 
territorial understanding to looking at whether the state has a “sufficient con-
nection” to the regulated conduct under several “general principles of juris-
diction.”42 
Perhaps the most well-established principle is that states may generally 
regulate the conduct of their own citizens abroad. This is known as the “active 
nationality principle.”43 More controversial is the “passive personality 
 
ses-before-national-courts/domestic-exercise-of-universal-jurisdiction/ (last visited Oct. 5, 
2019) (discussing the scope and application of universal jurisdiction in foreign countries). 
 39 S.S. “Lotus”, Judgement, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7): 
International law governs relations between independent States. The 
rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free 
will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as ex-
pressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the rela-
tions between these co-existing independent communities or with a view 
to the achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon the independence 
of States cannot therefore be presumed. 
 40 Id. 
 41 “[The] principle of the exclusive competence of the State in regard to its own territory 
. . . [is] the point of departure in settling most questions that concern international rela-
tions.” Island of Palmas Case (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R. Int’l Arb. Award 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. 
Arb. 1928). 
 42 Menno T. Kamminga, Extraterritoriality, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L 
LAW ¶10 (2012), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-978 
0199231690-e1040?rskey=9rWvEm&result=1&prd=EPIL#. 
 43 Id. at ¶11. 
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principle”, which allows states to regulate foreign conduct which injures its 
own nationals.44 In both cases, however, the state asserting jurisdiction can 
show a direct and tangible link to its own interests—namely the protection 
and regulation of its own citizens. 
More controversial still is the so-called “protective principle” of jurisdic-
tion, where a state regulates foreign conduct based on the perceived harm that 
such conduct will cause to the state’s interests.45 This principle covers conduct 
such as terrorism, forgery, and other crimes related to national security.46 In-
creasingly, however, it is also used to regulate financial transactions and se-
curities transactions.47 This is the theory that the United States asserts in order 
to regulate financial activity abroad that could have a significant impact on 
the stability of United States financial markets. United States courts couch the 
protective principle as an “effects test”.48 This principle is not on its face con-
troversial, but the difficulty comes in trying to find a discernable limit on what 
constitutes a significant enough effect to justify invoking this principle of ju-
risdiction.49 Unlike the traditional national security basis, the “effect” of a fi-
nancial transaction is often not targeted on the United States—and likely not 
even intended. The application of an effects test for financial transactions is 
not universally accepted as a basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction in interna-
tional law.50 
Finally, international law generally recognizes the concept of universal ju-
risdiction, but only in limited and exceptional circumstances. Universal juris-
diction applies “only to certain crimes under international law that have been 
made subject to universal jurisdiction either by a multilateral treaty or under 
customary international law.”51 These include crimes such as genocide or 
other crimes against humanity.52 Even in the human rights context, the exer-
cise of universal jurisdiction is far from uncontroversial. In The Arrest War-
rants Case, applicants to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) challenged 
Belgium’s exercise of universal jurisdiction when four Rwandans were con-
victed in a Belgian court for crimes against humanity relating to the 1994 
Rwandan Genocide.53 The ICJ overturned the challenged arrest warrant due 
 
 44 Id. at ¶12. 
 45 Id. at ¶13. 
 46 Id. 
 47 See generally Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
 48 Id. at 257–58. 
 49 See Kamminga, supra note 42, at ¶13 (“Although the validity of this principle is not 
contested it provides a rather uncertain basis for the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
because the conditions under which it may be relied upon are ill-defined.”). 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at ¶14. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Belgium), 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 15 (Feb. 14). 
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to the fact that the target of the warrant was a government official in the Dem-
ocratic Republic of the Congo, and thus immune to suit in Belgium.54 The ICJ 
did not address the validity of the Belgian law creating universal jurisdiction, 
however.55 Many countries, especially in Europe, have laws creating universal 
jurisdiction for genocide, torture, and other such crimes. 
It is important to note that while there are international norms regarding 
when a state may exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction, international law does 
not actually create such jurisdiction. States, as sovereign entities, are free to 
pass laws which take effect anywhere. International law instead merely cre-
ates norms of behavior that proscribe states from exercising their jurisdiction 
outside these areas. 
International law provides a normative hierarchy for enforcement when 
the laws of multiple countries apply. Traditionally, a state enforcing law based 
on its territorial jurisdiction has a right of enforcement superseding that of a 
state seeking to enforce a law of universal jurisdiction.56 Reading between the 
lines, the extraterritorial application of laws is therefore an exception to the 
norm, and one that appears to be reserved for exceptional circumstances (or 
cases of bilateral agreement to let one country prosecute). 
International law therefore presents a clear norm of not applying law ex-
traterritorially outside certain circumstances. This norm should still stand 
even when the conduct in question might be “territorial” on the routing of a 
circuit board, but which is still predominantly taking place in a country other 
than the United States. 
III. THE HISTORY AND CURRENT STATE OF ELECTRONIC DOLLAR-
CLEARING 
Each year globally, the United States Dollar is used in transactions totaling 
in the trillions of dollars.57 These transactions are often the products of lengthy 
negotiation and contract drafting processes. As lawyers, there is a tendency to 
think that once a check is transferred or a wire ordered, the deal is over. This, 
however, only begins another process which can have unforeseen conse-
quences for the parties to the original transaction. Unless a transaction is con-
ducted in cash, the transaction must be “cleared” so that one party’s account 
is debited, and the other party’s is credited for the same amount.58 In 1770, 
 
 54 Id. at ¶ 71. 
 55 Id. at ¶ 41. 
 56 Bernard H. Oxman, Jurisdiction of States, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L 
LAW ¶51 (2007) (“[I]n general, territorial jurisdiction is primary and that extraterritorial 
jurisdiction must be restrained in deference to the policies of the State where the act or 
omission occurs.”). 
 57 Will Kenton, What is Fedwire?, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 13, 2019), https://www.investop 
edia.com/terms/f/fedwire.asp. 
 58 James Chen, Clearing, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/t 
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clerks for several London banks began meeting nightly in a tavern to centrally 
clear the checks that had been deposited at the various banks. This centralized 
process saved massive amounts of time and money rather than having clerks 
shuttle between banks individually.59 In the intervening centuries, the clearing 
process has been digitized to occur nearly instantaneously with almost no hu-
man interaction.60 
In 2015, the Clearing House Interbank Payment System (CHIPS) pro-
cessed over $1.5 trillion in transactions daily.61 CHIPS is a private clearing-
house jointly owned by around fifty global financial institutions.62 Essentially 
every large-scale transaction involving the U.S. Dollar goes through CHIPS.63 
Additionally, many transactions routed through CHIPS do not even directly 
involve the U.S. Dollar. Instead, they are transactions between two currencies 
which may not easily be exchanged, where the dollar is used as an intermedi-
ary currency to facilitate exchange.64 
The status of CHIPS (or other U.S-based clearing systems, such as Fed-
Wire) as the institution of choice for dollar-clearing, however, is far from a 
permanent fixture of the global economy. In response to U.S. civil and crimi-
nal sanctions imposed on the basis of dollar-clearing operations, foreign banks 
have started exploring alternatives to U.S.-based operations. Currencies such 
as the Chinese Renminbi or the Euro are increasingly used as alternative trans-
action currencies.65 As currency exchanges become increasingly de-central-
ized and formerly radical alternatives like cryptocurrency become more main-
stream, other financial centers could easily emerge as the hubs of electronic 
commerce. For now, however, the clearing of “payments through New York 
is a routine and universal aspect of the international financial system.”66 
Given the potential for disruption and the longstanding reluctance of the 
United States to subject itself to foreign or international legal restrictions, the 
 
erms/c/clearing.asp. 
 59 Minouche Shafik, Deputy Governor, Bank of England, Speech: A New Heart for a 
Changing Payments System, 2 (Jan. 27, 2016). 
 60 Id. 
 61 CHIPS, CLEARING HOUSE, https://www.theclearinghouse.org/payment-systems/chips 
(last visited Jan. 25, 2020). 
 62 Id. 
 63 Machreqbank P.S.C. v. Ahmen Hamad Al Gosaibi & Bros., 989 N.Y. S.2d 458 (N.Y. 
2014) (quoting EDMUND M.A. KWAW, LAW & PRACTICE OF OFFSHORE BANKING & FINANCE 
19 (1996) (“all wholesale international transactions involving the 
use of the dollar go through CHIPS . . .”). 
 64 Brief for the Institute of International Bankers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respond-
ents, p. 13–14, Jesner v. Arab Bank, P.L.C., 137 S. Ct. 1432, 2017 WL 4325882. 
 65 Ernest T. Patrikis, Will Enforcement of US Sanctions Reshape How US-Dollar Trans-
actions Are Cleared?, FINANCIER WORLDWIDE (Sept. 2014), https://www.financierworldwi 
de.com/will-enforcement-of-us-sanctions-reshape-how-us-dollar-transactions-are-cleared 
/#.XaCmbedKiu1. 
 66 Brief for Institute of International Bankers, supra note 64, at 14. 
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current precedent of routine currency-clearing operations serving as a basis 
for functionally universal jurisdiction is unsustainable. 
 
A. Previous U.S. Treatment of Dollar-Clearing Operations in Relation to 
Extraterritoriality 
 
The United States has not clearly articulated a standard for the treatment 
of dollar-clearing operations and whether or not they overcome the presump-
tion against extraterritoriality. As discussed previously, the various courts de-
ciding Jesner and other ATS litigation have taken pains to avoid ruling defin-
itively on the status of dollar-clearing. In addition to the deferred prosecution 
agreement United States v. JGC, U.S. prosecutors have entered into similar 
agreements with other banks based on their use of dollar-clearing operations. 
Perhaps the single largest such action was the 2014 investigation into French 
bank BNP Paribas, then the fifth-largest bank in the world.67 
Prosecutors charged the bank with skirting U.S.-imposed sanctions on 
Iran, Sudan, and Cuba specifically relating to BNP Paribas’s energy and com-
modities trading business.68 At the time of the investigation, BNP maintained 
offices in New York for the purposes of dollar-clearing transactions, and some 
of the transactions in question were routed—for the purposes of clearing—
through CHIPS and FedWire.69 
Prosecutors initially sought more than a $10 billion dollar fine, but BNP 
Paribas pled guilty and paid over $8 billion.70 In addition to the fine, New 
York State’s financial regulatory authority suspended BNP Paribas’s ability 
to conduct dollar-clearing for a year, forcing the bank to contract with other 
institutions in order to maintain critical clearing operations.71 While BNP 
Paribas’s case did not hinge solely on the bank’s dollar-clearing operation, 
prosecutors used the bank’s reliance on U.S. clearing operations as a “hook” 
to force the bank to enter settlement negotiations. 
 
 67 Devlin Barrett et al., Justice Dept. Seeks More Than $10 Billion Penalty from BNP 
Paribas, WALL ST. J. (May 29, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-dept-seeks-mo 
re-than-10-billion-penalty-from-bnp-paribas-1401386918; Andrew Cunningham, Biggest 
Global Banks 2014, GLOB. FIN. (Nov. 13, 2014), https://www.gfmag.com/magazine/nove 
mber-2014/biggest-global-banks-2014?page=2. 
 68 See Barrett et al., supra note 67. 
 69 Duncan Kerr, Clearing: European Banks Weigh up US Dollar Clearing Options, 
EUROMONEY (Jan. 5, 2015), https://www.euromoney.com/article/b12kjyygbzp9v4/clearin 
g-european-banks-weigh-up-us-dollar-clearing-options. 
 70 Karen Freifeld, Exclusive: BNP Asks Other Banks for Help as Dollar Clearing Ban 
Nears, REUTERS (Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bnp-paribas-clearing/e 
xclusive-bnp-asks-other-banks-for-help-as-dollar-clearing-ban-nears-idUSKCN0HV28C 
20141006. 
 71 Id. 
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In perhaps the most tenuous application of U.S. law to dollar-clearing 
transactions, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) fined two banks in 
Singapore for violating sanctions against Iran.72 There, the banks did not even 
clear the transactions through the United States – Singapore, along with Hong 
Kong, Tokyo, and Manilla are the only official overseas clearing centers (due 
to the time difference).73 Even though the actual transaction occurred in Sin-
gapore, OFAC took the position that because the Federal Reserve supplies 
some of the funds used to settle clearing imbalances, the Singaporean banks 
had caused U.S. financial instruments to be transferred to Iran in violation of 
U.S. sanctions.74 In all these actions, U.S. prosecutors have rested a significant 
portion of their authority on the assumption that clearing a transaction is the 
same as conducting the transaction. However, like many such actions against 
large financial corporations, the banks in question entered into guilty pleas or 
deferred prosecution agreements, and thus did not subject prosecutors’ asser-
tions of authority to full judicial review and challenge. 
Few U.S. courts have spoken directly on the territoriality of dollar-clearing 
operations. The New York Court of Appeals in Mashreqbank PSC found that 
dollar-clearing would not support jurisdiction in New York State Court.75 
However, that same court only two years prior had answered a certified ques-
tion from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, finding that a foreign bank’s 
maintenance of a correspondent bank account with another bank for the pur-
poses of dollar-clearing was a “transaction” within the jurisdiction of New 
York’s long-arm statute.76 Both cases, however, were civil actions brought by 
foreign plaintiffs. While the reliance on a long-arm statute would suggest that 
Licci was a determination of personal jurisdiction, rather than extraterritorial-
ity, the same underlying logic would apply. The Licci court’s determination 
that the transactions “happened” in New York—and thus were within the 
scope of New York’s long arm statute—would also mean that the transaction 
was territorial, or not subject to the presumption against extraterritoriality. 
Much like the broader question of extraterritoriality, it would seem that 
dollar-clearing is treated differently in the civil and the criminal contexts. In 
all cases, however, the same conduct is in question. A decisive ruling on 
whether dollar-clearing is sufficient contact with the United States to get 
around the presumption against extraterritoriality would theoretically apply 
equally to civil and criminal cases. 
 
 72 Clif Burns, Touch a U.S. Dollar Anywhere, Go Directly to U.S. Jail, OFAC (Aug. 2, 
2017), https://s3.amazonaws.com/documents.lexology.com/1db46ca4-05a2-41e4-b8cb-17 
ee7989fb3b.pdf#page=1 
 73 Id.; Kerr, supra note 69. 
 74 Burns, supra note 72. 
 75 Mashreqbank PSC v. Ahmed Hamad Al Gosaibi & Bros. Co., 12 N.E.3d 456, 460 
(2014). 
 76 Licci v. Lebanese Can. Bank, SAL, 984 N.E.2d 897 (N.Y. 2012). 
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IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF DOLLAR-CLEARING IN RELATION TO 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
A. Dollar-Clearing and the U.S. Presumption Against the Extraterritorial 
Application of Legislation 
 
To date, few U.S. courts have squarely addressed whether dollar-clearing 
operations touch and concern the United States with sufficient force to dis-
place the presumption against extraterritoriality. Currently, however, there is 
no unified doctrine for determining the whether or not a given action over-
comes the presumption of extraterritoriality. Circuit Courts of Appeals are 
split on whether the inquiry is context-specific, or whether a given action’s 
status is dependent on the type of action in the case. 
In the realm of securities actions, Morrison clearly establishes the focus 
test as the proper inquiry.77 Morrison did not displace the presumption when 
securities transactions were traded as part of a fraudulent scheme, because 
although the scheme was operated from the United States, the actual transac-
tions occurred in Australia.78 The Supreme Court concluded that the “focus” 
of the Securities Exchange Act was on actual securities transactions, rather 
than the related activities of the scheme.79 
Circuit courts have not uniformly applied Morrison’s focus test outside of 
the securities realm. In Kiobel, the Supreme Court ruled that to displace the 
presumption in Alien Torts Statute litigation, the actions in question must 
“touch and concern” the United States.80 Several circuits have interpreted Ki-
obel II to displace Morrison’s focus test, while others have viewed Kiobel II 
as a different wording of the same focus test from Morrison.81 
The Court in RJR Nabisco v. European Community attempted to clarify 
the analytical framework, but some courts still analyze extraterritoriality in 
the ATS context differently than they analyze extraterritoriality for other stat-
utes.82 The Ninth Circuit, in Mujica v. AirScan, Inc.,83 laid out a multifactor 
analysis, looking at more than the just the conduct at the “focus” of the statute 
to also incorporate factors such as the citizenship of the defendant(s) or the 
corporate involvement of the parties in the United States.84 In either case, 
 
 77 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266 (2010) (stating that courts 
should look to the territorial “focus” of the statute and whether the domestic conduct in 
question is on its own sufficient to displace the presumption). 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (Kiobel II) 
 81 Brief for Institute of International Bankers, supra note 64, at 9. 
 82 Id. at 10; RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016). 
 83 771 F.3d 580 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 84 Mohamed Chehab, Note, Finding Uniformity Amidst Chaos: A Common Approach to 
Kiobel’s “Touch and Concern” Standard, 93 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 119, 151 (2014). 
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whether under Morrison’s focus test or the Ninth Circuit’s broader interpre-
tation, corporate presence alone is not enough to displace the presumption.85 
The reasoning of the various courts would also suggest that dollar-clearing 
alone should not displace the presumption against extraterritoriality. Cer-
tainly, dollar-clearing in the United States, whether through a correspondent 
bank account or a U.S. branch, is more of a U.S. connection than mere corpo-
rate presence alone. However, dollar-clearing as a basis for jurisdiction would 
not meet the factors set out by the courts for overcoming the presumption. 
First, dollar-clearing, at least in isolation, is not an activity that is “fo-
cused” on the United States. By definition dollar-clearing is an ancillary ac-
tivity, given that it is an essentially mechanical function. And it is an activity 
that can occur without human intervention—and perhaps even without either 
party to the transaction knowing that it is occurring.86 
In the criminal context, U.S. courts have even suggested that the Fifth 
Amendment may limit the extraterritorial application of U.S. criminal law. 
The Second and Ninth Circuits, among others, have held that prosecution in 
the United States requires a sufficient nexus such that it is fair to the defend-
ant.87 Certainly, there are significant differences between the requirements for 
civil and criminal legislation. But as previously stated, the extraterritoriality 
of dollar-clearing would implicate both civil and criminal liability, as it would 
overcome the presumption regardless of the action being brought. Indeed, in 
the financial world, U.S. courts have more willingly displaced the presump-
tion in the criminal context than in the civil.88 
In the criminal context, dollar-clearing alone would not overcome the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality in part because its application to foreign 
defendants would not be “fair” under the above-reasoned analysis. Arguably, 
dollar-clearing would present even less of a connection to the United States 
than corporate presence, which does not overcome the presumption when 
standing alone. Unlike corporate presence, parties to a transaction may engage 
in dollar-clearing actions without “knowing” that it occurs. Moreover, banks 
that engage in dollar-clearing operations, especially through correspondent 
accounts with other financial institutions, are not availing themselves of 
United States jurisdiction. Rather, they are availing themselves of the cur-
rency. As many have noted, dollar-clearing is a functional necessity, rather 
than a conscious choice. As the Mashreqbank court observed, “[a]ll wholesale 
 
 85 Id. at 153. 
 86 Brief for Institute of International Bankers, supra note 64, at 13–14. 
 87 Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Terror-
ism and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 121, 162–
163 (2007). 
 88 See Bookman, supra note 9, at 1099. 
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international transactions involving the use of the dollar go through CHIPS.”89 
Under the Second and Ninth circuit’s due process analysis for extraterritorial 
application, this economic necessity would seemingly not constitute the avail-
ment implied by a fairness analysis. The use of dollar-clearing operations, es-
pecially through a correspondent account, is no more of an “availment” than 
paying with U.S. dollars in cash. 
 
B. Dollar-Clearing Under International Law 
 
Like under domestic law, dollar-clearing as a territorial action is counter 
to traditional notions of jurisdiction. While there is not the direct case law as 
there is domestic law, none of the traditionally accepted basses for state juris-
diction would support the United States’ exercise of jurisdiction based on dol-
lar-clearing alone. 
In a hypothetical case of “pure” dollar-clearing, or a case where dollar-
clearing alone is the purported basis for jurisdiction, only the effects basis and 
the territorial basis would sustain jurisdiction (assuming that there are no 
grounds for the exercise of universal jurisdiction). The only argument for the 
effects principle supporting jurisdiction would be that the clearing of suspect 
transactions through the United States would weaken the integrity or percep-
tion of the country’s financial system. Countries face severe negative conse-
quences, both formal and informal, for allowing unfettered access to financial 
institutions and failing to prosecute those who use them unscrupulously.90 Un-
like most countries, however, the actions in question here are relatively minor, 
and the U.S. extensively regulates financial institutions that actively conduct 
business in the United States.91 Additionally, the ubiquity and volume of dol-
lar-clearing operations may actually undermine and prevent negative interna-
tional perception. Given the volume of transactions, and their importance to 
 
 89 Mashreqbank PSC v. Ahmed Hamad Al Gosaibi & Bros. Co., 12 N.E.3d 456, 460 
(2014) (quoting Edmund M.A. Kwaw, LAW & PRACTICE OF OFFSHORE BANKING & 
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foreign financial institutions, the U.S. would likely not be subject to the same 
expectations that other countries are. 
The territoriality principle also would not support the exercise of jurisdic-
tion by the United States. There is no international equivalent to the “touch 
and concern” standard from Kiobel.92 The same factual considerations are at 
play, however, even if the threshold is more amorphous. As discussed previ-
ously, dollar-clearing transactions involve conduct that is mostly outside the 
United States. The actual action in the United States may be nothing more 
than electronic signals on a circuit board.93 Additionally, unlike piracy or 
other crimes on the high seas, there is conduct also occurring in another coun-
try. And in the case of a “pure” dollar-clearing transaction, significantly more 
of the activity would be occurring outside the United States than in it. 
V. INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
The U.S. has traditionally been relatively active in applying its laws out-
side its own territory, and this has been the source of significant international 
friction.94 Historically, the European Union has been especially critical of 
U.S. enforcement against actions European countries viewed as extraterrito-
rial. In 1980, the United Kingdom passed the Protection of Trading Interests 
Act, which provided claw-back provisions and blocking measures to stop the 
enforcement of U.S. antitrust judgements.95 The Trade Secretary stated the 
aim of the act was “to reassert and reinforce the defences of the United King-
dom against attempts by other countries to enforce their economic and com-
mercial policies unilaterally on us.”96 France also has previously enacted leg-
islation aimed at limiting U.S. enforcement of economic laws in France.97 
While U.S. courts often consider extraterritoriality from the perspective of 
preserving U.S. judicial resources, foreign countries impacted by U.S. judg-
ments view application of U.S. law abroad as a “unilateral instrument of 
American hegemony.”98 This effect is amplified when the U.S. will apply 
criminal sanctions overseas but will not provide the same access to court for 
 
 92 Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7) (noting that 
states are free to do as they wish, unless there is a specific prohibition against action). 
 93 Brief for Institute of International Bankers, supra note 64, at 13–14. 
 94 Developments in the Law: Extraterritoriality, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1226, 1246 (2011) 
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 95 A. V. Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The British Protection of Trading 
Interests Act, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 257 (1981). 
 96 Id. (citing 973 Parl Deb, HC (5th ser.) (1979) col. 1533 (UK)). 
 97 Developments in the Law: Extraterritoriality, supra note 94, at 1248. 
 98 Austin L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law from Extraterritoriality, 93 MINN. L. 
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foreign plaintiffs.99 Given the tense relationship between U.S. extraterritorial 
jurisdiction and foreign allies, the U.S. should tread carefully when its actions 
could affect international norms regarding extraterritoriality. 
VI. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD DECISIVELY RESOLVE THE STATUS OF 
DOLLAR-CLEARING AND FIND THAT IT ALONE IS NOT ENOUGH TO 
IMPLICATE U.S. JURISDICTION 
Given the potential for international repercussions and disruptions to the 
global financial system, the United States should conclusively resolve the is-
sue of dollar-clearing as it relates to territorial jurisdiction. The first and most 
important element of this is that courts should be wary of accepting jurisdic-
tion based on this conduct. Allowing jurisdiction based only on dollar-clearing 
would create an invasive norm and take away the legislative and executive 
branches’ ability to consider economic and foreign policy implications and 
selectively implement laws with extraterritorial application. Second, the U.S. 
should actively pursue an international agreement or norm restraining the ex-
ercise of jurisdiction based on currency clearing operations. 
 
A. U.S. Courts Should Not Interpret Dollar-Clearing Operations as Actions 
with Sufficient “Touch and Concern” to Displace the Presumption 
Against Extraterritoriality 
 
In the relatively short history of ATS litigation, courts have consistently 
been wary of creating litigation that has the potential to disrupt international 
relations. In Jesner, the Court articulated a concern that its actions would cre-
ate international discord, and that the political branches were better suited to 
navigating the minefield of foreign policy concerns.100 This is the main con-
cern underpinning the entire presumption against extraterritoriality—namely 
that the courts are ill-equipped to consider the non-legal concerns that the po-
litical branches must consider.101 
A decision affirming dollar-clearing as a basis for U.S. jurisdiction would 
create an invasive new international norm and could lead to significant inter-
national tension. Many countries, including close allies, have objected to the 
increasingly global application of U.S. law.102 Moreover, a finding that 
 
 99 Id. at 867. 
 100 Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1403 (2018) (“The political branches, not 
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 101 Id. at 1407. 
 102 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2107 n.9 (2016) (noting objections from other countries, 
including the United Kingdom and Canada, to the overseas application of U.S. antitrust 
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clearing operations are territorial would be a blunt instrument. Congress, in 
crafting legislation, has the ability to specify exactly which legislation would 
or would not have an extraterritorial effect. In contrast, a judicial decision 
would presumably apply to all causes of action, civil or criminal. 
Additionally, due to the dichotomy between international law and domes-
tic law, a U.S. ruling about the territoriality of dollar-clearing would not ob-
viate the United States of a perceived breach of international norms regarding 
universal jurisdiction. Assuming that dollar-clearing is internationally per-
ceived as non-territorial, a domestic court decision to the contrary does not 
validate the U.S.’s position internationally. Instead, it merely removes the po-
litical branches’ ability to selectively apply U.S. law extraterritorially and in 
compliance with international norms. 
 
B. The United States Should Actively Pursue a Restrained Agreement or 
Norm Regarding the Territoriality of Financial Transactions at the 
International Level 
 
Whereas the United States should tread lightly at the domestic level, it 
should actively seek the creation of agreeable norms at the international level. 
Presently, there is little, if any, agreement on how to prevent conflicting reg-
ulations at the international level.103 The potential for overlap is significant, 
and it can sometimes lead to situations where compliance with the two re-
gimes asserting jurisdiction is impossible—compliance in one jurisdiction 
may virtually ensure a violation in the other.104 In the past, there have been 
attempts to create a unified system for resolving these potential conflicts.105 
In order to create a robust international framework for resolving such con-
flicts, however, states must make an effort to curtail their own domestic re-
quirements so as to create room in the international space.106 
In the specific realm of currency clearing, the United States is uniquely 
positioned to shape international norms regarding jurisdiction. The United 
States Dollar is the overwhelming reserve currency of the world, and the 
United States has more currency clearing activity than any other nation. 
United States financial law has an enormous influence on other legal systems 
and international legal frameworks. The United States, therefore, is in a 
 
 103 Jurisdiction of States, MAX PLANK ENCYCLOPEDIAS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § D 
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 104 Animal Sci. Prod., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865 (2018) (af-
firming district court’s holding that the defendant violated U.S. price fixing laws even 
though the People’s Republic of China government stated that such measures were required 
under PRC domestic law). 
 105 Jurisdiction of States, supra note 103. 
 106 Parrish, supra note 98, at 856 (“The increasing propensity of states to apply domestic 
laws extraterritorially should trouble international law scholars . . . more than it has.”). 
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position to shape international norms through its own treatment of currency 
clearing’s effect on prescriptive jurisdiction. U.S. law recognizing currency 
clearing as not being a “territorial” activity will go a long way in establishing 
an international trend, if not norm, in the same direction. 
In order to effectuate this, however, the U.S. must state its reasons for 
change in a decidedly international way. The creation of international law re-
quires either treaty or customary practice.107 In the case of agreement, inter-
national cooperation is obviously required. For the creation of international 
norms, however, customary practice and opinio juris are both required.108 As 
the center of global finance, U.S. actions with respect to currency clearing is 
the customary practice of the world. To demonstrate opinion juris, however, 
the United States must give some indication that a restrained treatment of dol-
lar-clearing is not only a strategic choice, but one that is compelled by some 
legal obligation.109 
The United States has a long history of hesitance towards engagement with 
international law. Due to the unique position of the U.S. in the realm of cur-
rency clearing, however, the U.S. cannot withdraw. Instead, the U.S. must 
engage with international law, so as to create norms of conduct beneficial to 
long-term U.S. interests. 
 
 
 107 Statute of the International Court of Justice, I.C.J. Art. 38 (noting that prior decisions 
and scholarly works are more evidence of law, but not necessarily sources themselves). 
 108 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judg-
ment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 201 (June 27) (“For a new customary rule to be formed not 
only must the acts concerned ‘amount to a settled practice’ but they must be accompanied 
by the opinio juris sive necessitates.”). 
 109 Id.; North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Ger. v. Den.; Ger. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969 
I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 77 (Feb. 20) (“The need for such a belief, i.e. the existence of a subjective 
element, is implicit in the very notion of the opinio iuris sive necessitatis. The States con-
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